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A LINEAR DECOMPOSITION ATTACK
ALEXEI MYASNIKOV AND VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
Abstract. We discuss a new attack, termed a dimension or linear de-
composition attack, on several known group-based cryptosystems. This
attack gives a polynomial time deterministic algorithm that recovers the
secret shared key from the public data in all the schemes under consider-
ation. Furthermore, we show that in this case, contrary to the common
opinion, the typical computational security assumptions are not very
relevant to the security of the schemes, i.e., one can break the schemes
without solving the algorithmic problems on which the assumptions are
based. The efficacy of the attack depends on the platform group, so it
requires a more thorough analysis in each particular case.
1. Introduction
In this paper we discuss, following [37] and [38], a new general attack on
several known group-based cryptosystems. This attack works when the plat-
form groups (or some other related groups) are linear. We show that in this
case, contrary to the common opinion (and some explicitly stated security
assumptions), one does not need to solve the underlying algorithmic prob-
lems to break the scheme, i.e., there is another algorithm that recovers the
private keys without solving the principal algorithmic problem on which the
security assumptions are based. This changes completely our understand-
ing of security of these scheme. The efficacy of the attack depends on the
platform group, so it requires a specific analysis in each particular case. In
general one can only state that the attack is in polynomial time in the size
of the data, when the platform and related groups are given together with
their linear representations. Of course, this requires additional explanation
in the case of finite groups.
1.1. Motivation. The purpose of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, we de-
scribe a new very general attack, called the dimension or linear decompo-
sition attack, on several known crypto schemes. The attack is based on
elementary properties of finite dimensional linear spaces, to apply it one has
to represent the platform group (or semigroup, or algebra) as a subset of a
finite dimensional linear space. Furthermore, the schemes themselves should
The first author was partially supported by NSF grant DMS-1318716 and by Russian
Research Fund, project 14-11-00085.
The second author was supported by RFBR, project 13-01-00239a and by Russian
Research Fund, project 14-11-00085.
1
2 ALEXEI MYASNIKOV AND VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
be based on algorithmic problems of a particular type: the conjugacy search
problem, the decomposition search problem, the factorization problem, au-
tomorphic actions, - those ones that induce linear transformations on the
underlying linear space. Notice, that we do not require here that the group
embeds into the linear space homomorphically. Secondly, we show that the
security assumptions of the schemes under consideration (either stated ex-
plicitly or tacitly assumed in the description of the systems) do not hold in
the case of linear groups or semigroups, or algebras. Indeed, we show how
one can recover the private keys without solving the underlying algorithmic
problems. Thirdly, we discuss how to improve the schemes in order to fail
the dimension attack. The easiest way would be to choose only non-linear
groups as the platform groups. However, this would leave many interesting
groups, in particular all finite groups, out of reach. On the other hand,
the group might be linear, but the dimensions of its linear representations
could be so large that the dimension attacks become inefficient. Not much
in general is known about efficiency of linear representations of groups, most
of the general problems are wide open. In particular, it would be very in-
teresting to study minimal (and efficient) matrix representation of nilpotent
and polycyclic groups, and their holomorphs, and especially finite groups.
We discuss this issues below.
1.2. Results and the structure of the paper. In Section 2 we describe
some typical cryptosystems based on non-commutative groups (semigroups,
algebras). Most of them are best understood as various generalizations of
the classical Diffie-Hellman (DH) scheme. In particular, we discuss schemes
based on the conjugacy search problem, the decomposition and factorization
problems, and actions by automorphisms. It worth to mention here that
the famous Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld scheme [4] is not part of our discussion,
since, on the one hand, it is not of the Diffie-Hellman type, and on the other
hand, it is currently under another powerful linear algebra attack from [48].
In Section 3 we explain the basic ideas of the linear decomposition attacks
and provide some useful algorithms. The algorithms work in polynomial
time in the size of the public data described in the schemes. All these results
are rather theoretical: we did not try to improve neither on the efficacy of
the algorithms nor on the complexity bounds, no doubts that both could be
tighten up considerably.
In Section 4 we give cryptanalysis of a variety of group-based protocols
of the Diffie-Hellman type. There are two main results here. The first one
claims that the linear decomposition attacks give a polynomial time deter-
ministic algorithms that recover the secret shared key from the public data
in all the schemes we discuss in the section. The second one shows that in all
these schemes the typical computational security assumptions are not very
relevant to the security of the schemes, i.e., one can break the schemes with-
out solving the algorithmic problems on which the assumptions are based.
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This is rather striking since the schemes together with the assumptions were
known for some time and studied quite thoroughly.
1.3. Efficacy of linear decomposition attacks. As we have mentioned
above some of the DH-like schemes based on group theoretic problems
are susceptible to linear decomposition attacks, provided that the platform
groups (or some other related groups) are linear. One of the possible ways to
fail the attack is to use non-linear groups as platforms. However, this would
leave behind all finite groups, which are known to be linear. Another way
is to allow linear groups G as platforms, but only those ones whose small-
est faithful linear representations G → GLn(F) have ”prohibitively high”
dimensions n that makes dimension attacks implausible. Of course, if the
platform group G is fixed then the dimension of any fixed linear represen-
tation of G is a constant, so the dimension attack still works in polynomial
time (though the constants in the polynomials could be very large). To
make the situation more clear one has to consider a class C of platform
groups such that the dimension n(G) of a smallest linear representation of
G grows exponentially with respect to the size of the given description of G
(for example, with respect to the size of the given finite presentation of G in
terms of generators and relators). This approach accommodates naturally
any infinite class C of finite groups.
Notice, that the class of linear groups is very large. Besides finite groups
it contains finitely generated nilpotent groups, arbitrary polycyclic groups,
right angled Artin and braid groups, holomorphs of polycyclic groups, etc.
Not all finitely generated metabelian groups are linear, but all of them admit
faithful representations into finite direct products of general linear groups.
Surprisingly, not much is known about the dimensions of smallest faith-
ful linear representations of such infinite groups as nilpotent, or polycyclic,
even less about metabelian groups. Graaf and Nickel [14] and Nickel in [33]
studied the classical linear representations of finitely generated torsion-free
nilpotent groups G into UTn(Z) from the algorithmic view-point, showing
in particular that there are polynomial time (in the Hirsh length of G) al-
gorithms to construct the representations. Recently, in [17] Habeeb and
Kahrobaei, following [33], showed that the dimension of the classical rep-
resentations above is O(n2) where n is the Hirsh length of the group. It
seems the dimension is not prohibitively high in this case. However, there
nilpotent groups with presentations (in generators and relators) which size
is logarithmically smaller then their Hirsh length. Indeed, free nilpotent
groups of class c and rank r have presentations with r generators and no
relations in the variety of nilpotent groups of class at most c, but their
Hirsh length is about rc+1. On the other hand, to use a group G as a plat-
form in cryptography requires a fast solution of the word problem in G,
as well as fast algorithms for computing normal forms of group elements
(see [32] for details). It seems the known algorithms for computing nor-
mal forms in nilpotent groups rely on so-called polycyclic presentations of
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nilpotent groups, which size is about the same as the Hirsh length of the
group. Situation with finite nilpotent groups is even more interesting. Some
upper bounds for dimensions of smallest linear representations of say finite
p-groups are known: in [21] Janusz showed that the minimal faithful rep-
resentation of a finite p-group as a group of matrices over a finite field of
characteristic p is 1+p(e−1) where e is the exponent of G, so the degree here
is quite large (for some groups it is comparable with the order of the group).
The discussion above highlights several interesting open problems in al-
gorithmic group theory, whose solution would shed some light on security of
the corresponding cryptosystems.
2. Crypto schemes under the dimension attack
Now we describe cryptosystems which to some extent are susceptible
to the dimension attack. But first a few words on terminology. Most of
the crypto schemes (systems, protocols) discussed below were not originally
stated within the formal rules of the current cryptographic practice (see,
for example, the book [24] for definitions of a cryptosystem) - usually some
of the required algorithms or parameters are not completely described, or
security assumptions are missing. In particular, it is hard to break such
schemes because the precise description is lacking. However, they make per-
fect sense as general ideas or ”general schemes” from which the concrete
protocols should be worked out after some research on sorting out which pa-
rameters are strong and which are not. The research itself usually comes as
a series of ”attacks” on the scheme and the subsequent cryptanalysis. Our
main intention in designing the dimension attack is not on breaking but on
improving the generic schemes at hands. In what follows we are focusing
on the choice of the so-called platform group, one of the main parameters
in the group-based cryptosystems, and discuss how security of the scheme
depends on the chosen platform. In particular, we shed some light on some
known (computational) security assumptions.
Most of the schemes we discuss in this paper the best can be seen in the
light of the famous Diffie-Hellman (DH) key establishment protocol [12].
The main idea of DH is very simple and can be described as follows. Two
users, say Alice and Bob, first choose the multiplicative group of integers
G = Z∗p modulo a prime number p, as the platform group, and some element
g ∈ G (all this data is public). Alice then selects a random integer k ∈ N
(her private key) and sends gk to Bob through a public channel. He in
turn picks l ∈ N (his private key) and sends gl to Alice through a public
channel. Both Alice and Bob can then compute their secret shared keys
K = gkl. An adversary, say Eve, monitoring the transmission between
Alice and Bob knows the public data G, g, gk , gl and her task is to recover
the shared key K (i.e., to break the scheme). The computational security
assumption claims that it is a time consuming task to recover the shared
key from the public data. Namely, the claim is that for a fixed G, any
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probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm succeeds in breaking the scheme
with only negligible probability. We refer to [24] for precise formulations.
Observe, that if Eve could compute either k or l, then she could findK easily.
Thus we arrive to the underlying algorithmic problem: recover Alice’s (or
Bob’s) private key from the public data. In the case of Diffie-Hellman the
underlying algorithmic problem is the famous discrete logarithm problem for
G, which asks whether or not one can compute (minimal non-negative) k
from given g and gk in probabilistic Ptime. For other schemes the underlying
algorithmic problems could be different. Notice, that it is important how
the group G and its elements are given: algebraically the same cyclic group
of order p (and its elements) could be given as integers between 0 and p− 1,
or as the group of an elliptic curve, or by a finite presentation, - the scheme
security depends on the presentation. Furthermore, the scheme still makes
sense when the group Z∗p is replaced by an arbitrary finite (or infinite) group
G. This gives rise to a general DH scheme. Various platform groups G were
suggested and studied, finite or not: the group of non-singular matrices over
a finite field [11], [34], over a group algebra [23], over a semigroup [15], etc.
Now we discuss some group based cryptoschemes with respect to the
algorithmic problems they are based on.
Schemes based on the conjugacy search problem. One of the possi-
ble generalizations of the general DH scheme to arbitrary non-commutative
group is to use the conjugacy in the place of exponentiation. Recall, that
the conjugate of an element g by an element x in a group is defined by
gx = xgx−1. The map φx : g → g
x is an automorphism of G, called con-
jugation. One of the principal DH-type schemes based on the conjugation
(instead of exponentiation) was introduced by Ko, Lee et. al. in [25]. In this
case let G be a platform group and U,W be two finite subsets of G which
are commuting element-wise, i.e., uw = wu for any elements u ∈ U,w ∈W .
Denote by A and B the subgroups of G generated by U and W correspond-
ingly and fix an element g ∈ G. All this data is assumed to be public.
Then Alice picks a private element a ∈ A and publishes ga. Bob picks
a private element b ∈ B and publishes gb. After that Alice computes a
shared secret KA = (g
b)a = gab, while Bob computes the same element
as Kb = (g
a)b = gba = gab. In this scheme the following is the underlying
algorithmic problem (like the discrete log for DH scheme):
• The conjugacy search problem (CSP) in a group G: given two ele-
ments g, f ∈ G and information that gx = f for some x ∈ G, find at
least one particular element x like that.
The CSP plays a special role in group-based cryptography. Many pro-
tocols and cryptosystems based on groups use one or another variation of
CSP. For example, the schemes [22, 25, 45, 50, 15] use CSP; [4, 5] use the
simultaneous CSP (when one has to solve in a group G a system of the type
gx1 = f1, . . . , g
x
k = fk).
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Schemes based on the decomposition and factorization problems.
Again, DH scheme in a group G can be simulated by replacing exponenti-
ation by right and left multiplication. One of the most typical schemes in
this area is due to Shpilrain and Ushakov [43]. In the notation above the
idea of the scheme is as follows. A group G, two element-wise commuting
subgroups A and B, and a fixed element g ∈ G are given. Then Alice picks
private elements a, a′ ∈ A and publishes the element aga′. Bob picks private
elements b, b′ ∈ B and publishes the element bgb′. After that Alice computes
a shared secret key KA = abgb
′a′, while Bob computes the same element as
KB = baga
′b′ = abgb′a′. In this scheme the underlying algorithmic problem
is the decomposition search problem.
• The decomposition search problem (DSP) in a group G: given two
subgroups A,B ⊆ G and two elements g, f ∈ G, find elements a ∈ A
and b ∈ B such that a · g · b = f, provided that at least one such pair
of elements exists.
There are two variations of DSP, which have been used in group-based
crypto:
• The factorization search problem (FSP) in a group G: given an ele-
ment f ∈ G and two subsets (usually subgroups) A and B of G, find
elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that a · b = f.
• The power conjugacy search problem (PCSP) in a group G: given
two elements g, f ∈ G and information that (gk)x = f for some
k ∈ N and x ∈ G, find at least one particular pair (k, x) like that.
Here are some schemes based on DSP and FSP: [1], [2], [3], [39], [42], [43],
[44], [46], [47]. The schemes [22], [40] use PCSP in matrix groups.
Schemes using actions by automorphisms. One natural generalization
of DH scheme is to replace exponentiation by arbitrary commuting auto-
morphisms of the group G. When the automorphisms are conjugations one
gets the scheme [25] described above. More precisely, let G be a group and
g ∈ G. By Aut(G) we denote the group of automorphisms of G. For g ∈ G
and φ ∈ Aut(G) by gφ we denote the image of g under φ. Suppose U,W
be two finite subsets of Aut(G) commuting element-wise. Denote by A and
B the subgroups in Aut(G) generated by U and W respectively. Now Al-
ice picks a ∈ A and publishes ga. Bob picks b ∈ B and publishes gb. Then
Alice computes a secret shared key KA = (g
b)a = gba, while Bob computes
the same element as KB = (g
a)b = gab = gba. The underlying algorithmic
problem is the search automorphism problem:
• The search automorphism problem in G: given a subgroup A ≤
Aut(G) and two elements g, h ∈ G find an automorphism a ∈ A
such that ga = h, provided that such an automorphism exists.
Schemes from [13], [15], [29] use the search automorphism (or endomor-
phism) problems in their design.
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3. The principle idea
In this section we describe the mathematical idea behind the linear de-
composition attacks. Our exposition is closely linked to the ”prototypical”
schemes discussed in Section 2.
3.1. Finding a basis. Let V be a finite dimensional vector space over a
field F with basis B = {v1, . . . , vr}. Let End(V ) be the semigroup of en-
domorphisms of V. We assume that elements v ∈ V are given as vectors
relative to B, and endomorphisms a ∈ End(V ) are given by their matrices
relative to B. For an endomorphism a ∈ End(V ) and an element v ∈ V
we denote by va the image of v under a. Also, for any subsets W ⊆ V and
A ⊆ End(V ) we put WA = {wa|w ∈ W,a ∈ A}, and denote by Sp(W ) the
subspace of V generated by W , and by 〈A〉 the submonoid generated by A
in End(V ).
The discussion below concerns with time complexity of some algorithms.
To this end we put some assumptions on computations in F.
Computational assumption on the fields We assume that elements of
the field F are given in some constructive form and the ”size” of the form
is defined. Furthermore, we assume that the basic field operations in F are
efficient, in particular they can be performed in polynomial time in the size
of the elements. In all the particular protocols considered in this paper the
filed F satisfies all these conditions.
For an element α ∈ F we write ‖α‖ for the size of α and put ‖v‖ =
max ‖αi‖ for a vector v = (α1, . . . , αr) ∈ V , and ‖a‖ = max{‖αij‖} for a
matrix a = (αij) ∈ End(V ).
Lemma 3.1 (Principal Lemma). There is an algorithm that for given finite
subsets W ⊆ V and U ⊆ End(V ) finds a basis of the subspace Sp(W 〈U〉)
in the form wa11 , . . . , w
at
t , where wi ∈ W and ai is a product of elements
from U . Furthermore, the number of field operations used by the algorithm
is polynomial in r = dimF V and the cardinalities of W and U .
Proof. Using Gauss elimination one can effectively find a maximal linearly
independent subset L0 of W . Notice that Sp(L
〈U〉
0 ) = Sp(W
〈U〉). Adding to
the set L0 one by one elements v
a, where v ∈ L0, a ∈ U and checking every
time linear independence of the extended set, one can effectively construct
a maximal linearly independent subset L1 of the set L0 ∪L
U
0 which extends
the set L0. Notice that Sp(L
〈U〉
0 ) = Sp(L
〈U〉
1 ) and the elements in L1 are of
the form wa, where w ∈ W and a ∈ 〈U〉. It follows that if L0 = L1 then
L0 is a basis of Sp(W
〈U〉). If L0 6= L1 then we repeat the procedure for L1
and find a maximal linearly independent subset L2 of L1 ∪ L
U
1 extending
L1. Keep going one constructs a sequence of strictly increasing subspaces
L0 < L1 < . . . < Li of V . Since the dimension r of V is finite the sequence
stabilizes for some i ≤ r. In this case Li is a basis of Sp(W
〈U〉) and its
elements are in the required form.
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To estimate the upper bound of the number of the field operations used by
the algorithm, observe first that the number of the field operations in Gauss
elimination performed on a matrix of size n× r is O(n2r). Hence it requires
at most O(n2r) steps to construct L0 fromW , where n = |W | is the number
of elements in W . Notice that |Lj | ≤ r for every j. So to find L + j + 1 it
suffices to perform Gauss elimination on the matrix corresponding to Lj∪L
U
j
which has size at most r + r|U |. Thus the upper estimate on this number
is O(r3|U |2). Since there are at most r iterations of this procedure one has
the total estimate as O(r3|U |2 + r|W |2). Of course, this estimate is very
crude. 
Corollary 3.2. With our assumptions on the field F the algorithm in
Lemma 3.1 works in polynomial time in the size of the inputs, i.e., in
r = dimF V , |W |, |U |, and max{‖w‖, ‖u‖ | w ∈W,u ∈ U}.
Notice, that the algorithm just described in lemma 3.1 can be obviously
adapted to noetherian modules over commutative rings.
3.2. The basic linear decomposition attack. Let as above V be a finite
dimensional vector space over a field F with basis B = {v1, . . . , vr} and U
and W be two finite subsets of End(V ).
Commutativity assumption We assume that every element of U com-
mutes with every element of W , i.e., for every v ∈ V, u ∈ U,w ∈W one has
vuw = vwu.
Let A and B be the submonoids of End(V ) generated by U and W corre-
spondingly. Suppose that a ∈ A, b ∈ B and v ∈ V . We assume that the field
F, the space V , the sets U,W and the vectors v, va, vb are public, while the
endomorphisms a and b are private. By the size of the public data we mean
the total size of the following parameters: r = dimF V (given in unary, i.e.,
as 1r), |W |, |U |, max{‖w‖, ‖u‖ | w ∈W,u ∈ U}, ‖v‖, ‖va‖, ‖vb‖.
Claim 1. Given U,W, v, va, vb one can find in polynomial time (in the
size of the public data) the vector vab = vba.
Proof. Indeed, given U and v by Principal Lemma (and its corollary) one
can find in polynomial time a basis of Sp(vA) in the form va1 , . . . , vat , where
ai ∈ A given as some particular products of elements from U . Using Gauss
elimination one can decompose va as a linear combination in the given basis:
va = Σti=1αiv
ai , αi ∈ F.
This allows one to compute vab as follows:
vab = (va)b = (Σti=1αiv
ai)b = Σti=1αiv
aib = Σti=1αiv
bai = Σti=1αi(v
b)ai .
which is immediate, since the vector vb and the matrices ai are known.
The conclusion is that one does not need to find neither a nor b to compute
the vector vab. 
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3.3. A linear group acting by conjugation. Let G be a finitely gener-
ated group that comes equipped with an injective homomorphism φ : G →
GLn(A), where A is a finite dimensional associative algebra over a field F.
Computational assumption on A As usual we assume that elements of
A are given in some constructive form and the ”size” of the form is defined.
Furthermore, we assume that the basic algebra operations in A are efficient,
so they can be performed in polynomial time in the size of the elements.
In particular, the matrix multiplication in Matn(A) can be performed in
polynomial time. Of course, all the conditions above obviously hold in the
case when A is just the field F.
Since the group G is finitely generated and multiplication in GLn(A) is
efficient one can compute in polynomial time the image gφ for any element
g ∈ G, given as a word in a fixed finite set of generators of G.
Notice, that V = Matn(A) can be viewed as a finite dimensional vector
space over F, where matrices from Matn(A) are tuples of length n
2 over A,
i.e., elements fromAn
2
. IfA has dimension r over F thenAn
2
can be viewed
as a vector space over F of dimension rn2 in which addition naturally comes
from the matrix addition in Matn(A). The group GLn(A) acts on V by
left as well as right multiplication. In both cases the homomorphism φ gives
a faithful representation φ : G → End(V ). It follows that any two given
elements g, h ∈ G determine an endomorphism Eg,h :Matn(A)→Matn(A)
defined by Eg,h(x) = φ(g)xφ(h). In particular, the conjugation by g ∈ G in
Matn(A) corresponds to the endomorphism Eg,g−1 .
Let U and W be two finite subsets of G satisfying the commutativity as-
sumption as above, i.e., every element of U commutes with every element of
W . Let A and B be the submonoids of G generated by U andW correspond-
ingly. Suppose that a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and v ∈ G. Put va = ava−1, vb = bvb−1.
We also assume that the algebra A, the group G, the embedding φ : G→
GLn(A), the sets U and W , as well as the elements v, v
a, vb are public. As
above the size of the public data is the total size of the following parameters:
r and n (given in unary), the sizes of U and W , and the sizes of all public
elements. Notice, that in this case we may assume that elements of G are
given as words in a fixed finite generating set. Due to our assumptions on
A and G the embedding φ is computable in polynomial time in the length
of the words representing elements in G, therefore the sizes of elements of
G computed as lengths of the words or the norms of the corresponding
matrices are within the polynomial bounds of each other. This implies that
the time complexity estimates for our algorithms will be similar if we use
representations of the elements as words or as the corresponding matrices.
Claim 2. Given U,W, g, ga, gb one can find in polynomial time (in the
size of the public data) the element gab = gba.
Proof. Indeed, the argument above shows that the embedding φ : G →
Matn(A) gives, in fact, an embedding φ : G→ End(V ) in such a way that
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conjugation by an element g ∈ G gives rise to an endomorphism Eg,g−1 ∈
End(V ). Since the embedding φ is polynomial time computable one finds
himself in the situation of the basic linear decomposition attack. Now Claim
2 follows immediately from Claim 1. 
There are several possible variations or generalizations of the basic scheme
described in this section, which also could be easily reduced to the basic
model. We mention some of them below.
3.4. A linear group acting by right/left multiplication. We assume
all the notation from Section 3.3. Beyond that assume also that a, a′ ∈ A
and b, b′ ∈ B.
Claim 3. Given U,W, g, agb, a′gb′ one can find in polynomial time (in
the size of the public data) the element a′agbb′ = aa′gb′b.
Proof. Indeed, an argument similar to the one in Section 3.3 reduces Claim
3 to the basic model. 
Obviously, Claim 2 is just a particular case of Claim 3. Observe also,
that Claim 3 holds if one replaces a group G by a semigroup G. The same
argument works in this case as well.
3.5. Groups acting by automorphisms. Let G be a finitely generated
group and Aut(G) the group of automorphisms of G. Let U and W be two
finite subsets of Aut(G) satisfying the commutativity assumption as above:
every element u of U commutes with every element w of W in Aut(G), i.e.,
for any g ∈ G the equality guw = gwu holds.
Denote by A and B the submonoids (or subgroups) of Aut(G) gener-
ated by U and W correspondingly. Now one can consider an analog of the
situation described in Section 3.3, where the conjugations are replaced by ar-
bitrary automorphisms. Namely, suppose some automorphisms a ∈ A, b ∈ B
are chosen. The question arises weather there is a polynomial time algorithm
which when given U ⊆ Aut(G),W ⊆ Aut(G), g ∈ G, and the images ga and
gb for some elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B computes the element gab = gba in G.
Even if the group G is linear (and the embedding φ : G→ GLn(A) is given)
still in this case there is no obvious reduction to Claims 1 or 2. Indeed, in
this case arbitrary automorphisms from Aut(G) do not in general induce
endomorphisms on the linear space V (in the notation above). However the
reduction would be possible if one can interprete the automorphisms as con-
jugations in some (perhaps larger) linear group. Now we discuss one group
theoretic construction that can be useful here.
Recall that the holomorph H(G) of a group G is a semidirect product
H(G) = G ⋊ Aut(G) of G and Aut(G), where the multiplication on pairs
from G × Aut(G) is defined by (g, a)(h, b) = (gha, ab). By construction
the groups G and Aut(G) embed into H(G) via injections g → (g, 1) and
a → (1, a). Notice, that every automorphism a ∈ Aut(G) acts on G by a
conjugation in H(G), since (1, a)(h, 1)(1, a−1) = (ha, 1). It follows that if
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the holomorph H(G) is a linear group, in particular if there is an injective
homomorphism φ : H(G)→ GLn(A) for some n and A as above, then this
case can be reduced to Claim 2. In particular, the following result holds.
Claim 4. Suppose that H(G) is a linear group. Then in the notation
above given U,W, g, ga, gb one can find in polynomial time (in the size of the
public data) the element (ga)b = (gb)a.
Observe, that the holomorph H(G) is linear when the group G is finite
or polycyclic-by-finite [30].
Suppose, a platform group G = gp(g1, ..., gr) is given by its generators and
defining relations. To apply the linear decomposition we need in effective
embedding µ of G into a linear group GLn(F). Let µ(g) be a secret date
that we get applying our approach to µ(G). We have to recover g as the
result in the original language. Suppose, there is an effective procedure of
rewriting µ(g) as a word w(µ(g1), ..., µ(gr)) in the images µ(gi), i = 1, ..., r, of
generators. Then g = w(g1, ..., gr) and we succeed. There are several papers
giving such algorithms. See [6] and references there. Let us to cite from
this paper: ”A constructive membership test not only answers the question
whether or not a given element belongs to a given group but in the case of
positive answer, it also provides a straight-line program that constructs the
given element from the given generators of the group.”
Recall, that constructive membership is the problem of expressing an
element in terms of the generators of the group.
Let G be a group and S ⊆ G. A straightline program reaching some g ∈ G
from S is a sequence (w1, ..., wm), wi ∈ G, such that for each i either wi ∈ S
or wi = w
−1
j for some j < i or wi = wjwk for some j, k < i.
Let G ≤ H be groups; let G be given by a generating set S. The con-
structive membership problem for G in H is, given g ∈ H, decide whether
g ∈ G, and if so find a straight-line program over S reaching g.
There is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm which uses number the-
ory oracles and given a matrix group G of odd characteristic p solves con-
structive membership in G.
Previously similar results were given by E.M. Luks [28] for solvable matrix
groups only. Luk’s algorithms are deterministic. Other algorithms and their
analysis build on a large body of prior work and most notably on the papers
[7], [35], [20].
4. Cryptanalysis of protocols
4.1. Protocols based on conjugation.
1) Ko, Lee et. al. key establishment protocol. [25].
Let G be a group and U,W be two finite subsets ofG which are commuting
element-wise. Denote by A and B the subgroups of G generated by U and
W correspondingly. Fix an element g ∈ G. We assume that all the data
above is public.
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Algorithm. Alice picks a private element a ∈ A and publishes ga. Bob
picks a private element b ∈ B and publishes gb.
Key establishment. Alice computes KA = (g
b)a = gab. Bob computes
Kb = (g
a)b = gba = gab. The shared key is K = KA = KB = g
ab.
Cryptanalysis. If the group G is linear then by Claim 2 there exists
an algorithm that given the public data above finds the shared key K in
polynomial time.
In the original version of this cryptosystem [25] G was proposed to be
the Artin braid group Bn on n strings. R. Lawrence described in 1990 a
family of so called Lawrence representations of Bn. Around 2001 S. Bigelow
[8] and D. Krammer [26] independently proved that all braid groups Bn are
linear. Their work used the Lawrence-Krammer representations ρn : Bn →
GLn(n−1)/2(Z[t
±1, s±1]) that has been proved faithful for every n ∈ N. One
can effectively find the image ρn(g) for every element g ∈ Bn. Moreover,
there exists an effective procedure to recover a braid g ∈ Bn from its image
ρn(g). It was shown by J.H. Cheon and B. Jun in [10] that it can be done in
O(2m3logdt) multiplications of entries in ρn(g). Here m = n(n − 1)/2 and
dt is a parameter that can be effectively computed by ρn(g). See [10] for
details. Therefore, in this case there is a polynomial time algorithm to find
the shared key K from the public data. The algorithm presented here is
more practical. Constructing of a basis is off-line. In every session we have
to find on-line by the Gauss elimination process coordinates of elements in
given basis of vector space.
Let Alg(CJ) denotes the Cheon-Jun’s algorithm, and let Alg(LD) denotes
the linear decomposition attack. We can compare these two algorithms.
(1) Alg(CJ) is not deterministic because it look for invertible solutions
of underlying sets of linear equations. Alg(LD) is completely deter-
ministic.
(2) Alg(CJ) works on-line. Alg(LD) works mostly off-line.
(3) Alg(CJ) deals with bigger sets of variables and equations than Alg(LD)
does.
(4) Alg(CJ) uses specific embedding µ, but Alg(LD) can work with
all effective linear representations. Thus Alg(LD) can be used on
different platforms.
2) Wang, Cao et. al. key establishment protocol. [50].
Let G be a non-commutative monoid. Fix an element g ∈ G. Let x be an
invertible element of G. It is assumed that G, g, x are public.
Algorithm. Alice picks a private number s ∈ N and publishes gx
s
. Bob
picks a private number t ∈ N and publishes gx
t
.
Key establishment. Alice computes KA = (g
xt)x
s
= gx
s+t
. Bob computes
KB = (g
xs)x
t
= gx
s+t
. The shared key is K = KA = Kb = g
xs+t .
A LINEAR DECOMPOSITION ATTACK 13
Cryptanalysis. If the monoid G is linear then by Claim 2 there exists
an algorithm that given the public data above finds the shared key K in
polynomial time.
However, in the paper [50] the authors used the semigroup G of 3 × 3
matrices of 1000-truncated polynomials in 10 variables over the ring (not a
field) Z12, which does not reduces directly to Claim 2.
Nevertheless, a slight modification of the linear decomposition attack
works in this case as well.
4.2. Protocols based on left/right multiplication.
3) B. Hurley and T. Hurley’s authentication and digital signature protocols.
[18], [19].
Let G be a commutative subgroup of GLn(F). These dates are public.
Algorithm:
(1) Bob picks y ∈ Fn and B ∈ G, computes and publishes yB.
(2) Alive wants to send a message x ∈ Fn to Bob. She picks A1, A ∈ G,
computes and sends (xA, yBA1) to Bob.
(3) Bob picks B1, B2 ∈ G, computes and sends (xAB1, yA1B2) to Alice.
(4) Alice computes (xB1, yB2) and sends xB1 − yB2 to Bob.
(5) Bob computes x− yB2B
−1
1 and recovers x.
Bob may use yB in further transactions.
Cryptanalysis. Since the group G is linear then by Claim 3 there exists an
algorithm that given the public data above finds the message x in polynomial
time. Indeed, let us describe the recovering algorithm.
(1) By Claim 3 we build a basis of the space Sp(yBA1)G. Let this basis
is {yBA1C1, ..., yBA1Cr}, where Ci ∈ G, i = 1, ..., r.
(2) Then we obtain yB =
∑r
i=1 αiyBA1Ci, αi ∈ F.
(3) Swap yBA1 by yA1B2. We have
∑r
i=1 αiyA1B2Ci = yB2.
(4) Similarly, we construct a basis xAB1D1, ..., xAB1Dt,Dj ∈ G, j =
1, ..., t, of Sp(xAB1)G.
(5) Compute xA =
∑t
i=1 βixAB1Di, βi ∈ F.
(6) Swap xAB1 by xB1 − yB2. We have
∑t
i=1 βi(xB1 − yB2)Di = x −
yB2B
−1
1 .
(7) Swap again xAB1 by yB2 and get
∑t
i=1 βiyB2Di = yB2B
−1
1 .
(8) Compute x.
4) Stickel’s key exchange protocol. [47].
Let G be a nonabelian finite group and let g and f be two non-commuting
elements of G. Let k0 and l0 be the orders of g and f, respectively. It is
assumed that G, g, f, k0, l0 are public.
Algorithm. Alice picks two private positive numbers k and l, 1 < k <
k0, 1 < l < l0, and publishes g
kf l. Bob picks two private positive numbers r
and s, 1 < r < k0, 1 < s < l0, and publishes g
rf s.
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Key establishment. Alice computes the element KA = g
k(grf s)f l =
gk+rf l+s. Bob computes the element KB = g
r(gkf l)f s = gk+rf l+s. The
shared key is K = KA = KB = g
k+rf l+s.
Cryptanalysis. If G ≤ Matn(A) (as is the case in [47]) then by Claim 3
there exists an algorithm that given the public data above finds the shared
key K in time polynomial in n,dimF(A), k0, l0 and the sizes of g and f (we
assume that the field F is fixed).
Remark. A similar cryptanalysis applies when G is an arbitrary (not
necessary finite) linear group.
5) A´lvarez, Martinez’ et. al. key exchange protocol. [1], [2], [3].
Given a prime number p and two positive numbers n,m Alice and Bob
choose two matrices Mi =
(
Ai Xi
0 Bi
)
, for i = 1, 2, respectively. Here,
Ai ∈ GLn(Fp), Bi ∈ GLm(Fp), Xi ∈ Mn×m(Fp). Let |Mi| = mi, for i = 1, 2,
be the orders of these matrices, respectively. For any positive number t one
has M ti =
(
Ati X
(t)
i
0 Bti
)
, i = 1, 2.
Algorithm.
Alice picks two private positive numbers ki, 1 ≤ ki ≤ mi− 1, i = 1, 2, and
publishes C =Mk11 M
k2
2 =
(
AC XC
0 BC
)
.
Bob picks two private positive numbers li, 1 ≤ li ≤ mi − 1, i = 1, 2, and
publishes D =M l11 M
l2
2 =
(
AD XD
0 BD
)
.
Key establishment.
Alice computes KA = A
k1
1 ADX
(k2)
2 +A
k1
1 XDB
k2
2 +X
(k1)
1 BDB
k2
2 .
Bob computes KB = A
l1
1 ACX
(l2)
2 +A
l1
1 XCB
l2
2 +X
(l1)
1 BCB
l2
2 .
The shared key is: K = KA = KB .
It was noted in [49] that K is the (1, 2) entry of Mk1+l11 M
k2+l2
2 .
Cryptanalysis. By Claim 3 there exists an algorithm that given the public
data above finds the shared key K in time polynomial in n,m,m1,m2 and
the sizes of the matrices M1 and M2 (we assume that the field Fp is fixed).
6) Shpilrain-Ushakov’s key exchange protocol. [43] (see also [31]).
Here we describe the general (non-twisted) version of the protocol and
show that if the platform group is linear then there is an efficient attack to
recover the shared key. There is also a twisted version of the protocol, to
which our cryptanalysis applies as well, so we omit it here and we leave the
details to the reader. Notice, that in the original paper [43] the suggested
platform is the Thompson group, which is non-linear, so our attack does not
apply here.
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Let G ≤ Mn(A) be a group (or a submonoid) and let g be an element of
G. Let A and B be two public finitely generated subgroups (or submonoids)
of G commuting element-wise.
Algorithm. Alice picks private elements a, a′ ∈ A and publishes the ele-
ment aga′. Bob picks private elements b, b′ ∈ B and publishes the element
bgb′.
Key establishment. Alice computes KA = abgb
′a′. Bob computes KB =
baga′b′ = abgb′a′. The shared key is: K = KA = Kb = abgb
′a′.
Cryptanalysis. By Claim 3 there exists an algorithm that given the public
data above finds the shared key K in time polynomial in n,dimF(A), and
the sizes of the fixed generating sets of A and B and the sizes of the elements
g, aga′, and bgb′ (we assume that the field F is fixed).
7) Romanczuk-Ustimenko key exchange protocol. [39]
Let G = GLn(F), where F is a finite field. Suppose C,D ∈ G be two
commuting matrices. Fix a vector g ∈ Fn. All this data is public.
Algorithm. Alice picks a polynomial P = P (C,D) ∈ F[x, y] and publishes
the vector gP . Bob picks a polynomial Q = Q(C,D) ∈ F[x, y] and publishes
the vector gQ.
Key establishment. Alice computes KA = (gQ)P = gQP and Bob com-
putes KB = (gP )Q = gPQ. The shared key is the vector K = KA = KB .
Cryptanalysis. By Claim 1 there exists an algorithm that given the public
data above finds the shared key K in time polynomial in n and the sizes of
C,D,P, and Q (we assume that the field F is fixed).
Remark. Another attack on this protocol, also based on linear algebra,
was proposed earlier by Blackburn at. al. in [9]. The main idea of the attack
is as follows.
Suppose an adversary Eve knows g, gP, gQ,C, and D. Let X be any
matrix such that X commutes with C and with D, and such that gQ = gX.
To find such an X it suffices to solve the corresponding system of linear
equations. Now Eve can compute the shared key as (gP )X = gXP =
gQP = K.
4.3. Protocols using automorphisms of groups.
8) Mahalanobis’ key exchange protocol 1. [29]
Let G be a group and g ∈ G. Suppose U,W be two finite subsets of
Aut(G) commuting element-wise. Denote by Φ and Ψ the subgroups in
Aut(G) generated by U and W respectively.
Algorithm. Alice picks φ ∈ Φ and publishes φ(g). Bob picks ψ ∈ Ψ and
publishes ψ(g).
Key establishment. Alice computes KA = φ(ψ(g)). Bob computes KB =
ψ(φ(g)) = φ(ψ(g)). The shared key is K = KA = KB = φ(ψ(g)).
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Cryptanalysis. IfG is such thatHol(G) is linear (a subgroup ofMatn(A))
then by Claim 4 there exists an algorithm that given the public data above
finds the shared key K in time polynomial in n,dimF(A) and the sizes of g
and the elements in U,W (we assume that the field F is fixed).
In the original paper [29] the author suggested a (finitely generated) non-
abelian nilpotent group G as the platform group. It is known (see, for
example, [30, 41, 27]) that the holomorph Hol(G) of every polycyclic group,
in particular, every finitely generated nilpotent group, admits a faithful
matrix representation. Hence the analysis above holds.
Observe, that the efficacy of the attack depends on the size of the linear
representation of the Hol(G). Not much is known about the dimensions of
minimal faithful representations of the holomorphs of nilpotent groups.
9) Mahalanobis’ key exchange protocol 2. [29]
We assume the notation above.
Algorithm. Alice picks φ ∈ Φ and sends gφ to Bob. Bob picks ψ ∈ Ψ and
sends (gφ)ψ = gφψ back to Alice. Alice computes φ−1 and gets gψ = gφψφ
−1
.
Then Alice picks another automorphism ξ ∈ Φ and sends (gψ)ξ = gψξ to
Bob.
Key establishment. Bob computes ψ−1 and gets ((gψ)ξ)ψ
−1
= gξ which is
his session key.
Cryptanalysis. Similar to the case above.
Indeed, assume Hol(G) ≤ Matn(A). Put v = g
φψ. As in Claim 1 one
can find a basis of Sp(vΨ), say vc1 , . . . , vct . Notice that gψξ ∈ Sp(vΨ) so
one can decompose
(1) gψξ =
t∑
i=1
αiv
ci = (
t∑
i=1
αi(g
φ)ci)ψ, for αi ∈ F.
Hence, (gξ)ψ = (
∑t
i=1 αi(g
φ)ci)ψ, so we derive
(2) gξ =
t∑
i=1
αi(g
φ)ci .
10) Habeeb, Kahrobaei, Koupparis and Shpilrain’s key exchange protocol.
[16]
Let G be a (semi)group, and Aut(G) be the automorphism group of G. Let
H(G) be the holomorph of G. Fix an element g ∈ G and an automorphism
φ ∈ Aut(G). All this data are public.
For this paragraph we write for g ∈ G and µ ∈ Aut(G) the image µ(g)
instead of gµ.
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Algorithm. Alice picks a private number m ∈ N. Then she computes
(φ, g)m = (φm, φm−1(g) · ... · φ2(g) · φ(g) · g) and sends only the second
component am = φ
m−1(g) · ... · φ2(g) · φ(g) · g of this pair to Bob.
Bob picks a private n ∈ N. Then he computes (φ, g)n = (φn, φn−1(g) · ... ·
φ2(g) · φ(g) · g) and sends only the second component an = φ
n−1(g) · ... ·
φ2(g) · φ(g) · g of this pair to Alice.
Key establishment. Alice computes (∗, an) · (φ
m, am) = (∗ · φ
m, φm(an) ·
am) = (∗ · φ
m,KA). Note that she does not actually ”compute” ∗ · φ
m.
Bob computes (∗∗, am) · (φ
n, an) = (∗ ∗ ·φ
n, φn(am) · an) = (∗ ∗ ·φ
n,KB).
Note that he does not actually ”compute” ∗ ∗ ·φn.
The shared key is K = KA = KB = am+n.
Cryptanalysis. Let G ≤ A, where A is a finite dimensional associative
algebra over a field F. Assume that the automorphism φ is extended to an
automorphism of the underlying vector space of A.
Using Gauss elimination we can effectively find a maximal linearly in-
dependent subset L of the set {a0, a1, ..., ak , ...}, where a0 = g and ak =
φk−1(g) · ... · φ(g) · g for k ≥ 1. Indeed, suppose that {a0, ..., ak} is linearly
independent set but ak+1 can be presented as a linear combination of the
form
ak+1 =
k∑
i=0
λiai for λi ∈ F.
Suppose by induction that ak+j can be presented as above for every j ≤
t− 1. In particular
ak+t−1 =
k∑
i=0
µiai for some µi ∈ F.
Then
ak+t = φ(ak+t−1) · g =
k∑
i=0
µiφ(ai) · g =
k∑
i=0
µiai+1 = µkλ0a0 +
k−1∑
i=0
(µi + µkλi+1)ai+1.
Thus L = {a0, ..., ak}.
In particular, we can effectively compute
an =
k∑
i=0
ηiai for some ηi ∈ F.
Then
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am+n = φ
m(an) · am =
k∑
i=0
ηiφ
m(ai) · am =
=
k∑
i=0
ηiφ
i(am) · ai.
Note that all data on the right hand side is known now. Thus we get the
shared key K = am+n.
In the original version of this cryptosystem [16] G was proposed to be
the semigroup of 3× 3 matrices over the group algebra F7[A5], where A5 is
the alternating group on 5 elements. The authors of [16] used an extension
of the semigroup G by an inner automorphism which is conjugation by a
matrix H ∈ GL3(F7[A5]). Therefore, in this case there is a polynomial time
algorithm to find the shared key K from the public data.
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